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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: DEFINING LIBERTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
A.

T.

KENNETH CRIBB,* MODERATOR

The topic for our panel this afternoon is constitutional interpretation. In each of the sessions that we have had thus far, we
have seen how large the question of interpreting a written text
looms in academic discussions of our fundamental law.
For example, in yesterday's commercial speech panel, Floyd
Abrams pointed out that political speech receives a higher degree
of protection, at least in part, because as an historical matter that
is what the Framers of the first amendment intended. I found it
interesting to hear Floyd Abrams make that argument. It says
something about how this debate has evolved in the last four
years or so. The special problems attendant upon interpreting a
democratically ratified, written fundamental law did not previously receive the same level of attention in legal academic circles.
I managed to get through three constitutional law courses at
the University of Virginia without any recourse to the text of the
Constitution whatsoever. Until recently, a leading constitutional
casebook did, in fact, contain the text of the Constitution, but it
was relegated to Appendix B. Well, Attorney General Meese
made this point in a speech he gave at a Federalist Society meeting. The author of the textbook responded by writing the Attorney General that, in the next edition, the Constitution would be
moved up to Appendix A. We can take that upgrading of the
Constitution to Appendix A as a tribute to Federalist Society
sponsorship of a public discussion that has been called the "Great
Debate on Constitutional Interpretation."
Before getting to the presentations of the panelists, it would be
useful to set out two formulations of the main question, as stated
by two worthy antagonists. Justice Brennan in a speech in 1985
put his position this way:
Those who would restrict claims of right to the values of 1789
specifically articulated in the Constitution turn a blind eye to
social progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles
to changes of social circumstance ....
For the genius of the
*

Senior Fellow at The Heritage Foundation.
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Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had
in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its
great principles to cope with the current problems and current
needs.'
Also in 1985, Judge Bork expressed the issue this way:
Whenever I speak on the subject someone invariably asks, "But
why should we be ruled by men long dead?" What the questioner is really driving at is why judges, not the public but
judges, should be bound to protect only those freedoms actually
specified by the Constitution. The objection underlying the
question is not to the rule of dead men, but to the rule of living
majorities.. . . A concept of original intent, one that focuses on

each specific provision of the Constitution rather than upon
generalized values, is essential to prevent courts from invading
the proper domain of democratic government.2
There are many side arguments and we will go into some of
them today, but I think the positions of those two distinguished
antagonists fairly put the main terms of the debate.
Once again, the Constitution is being discussed, at least in some
quarters, as law with its legitimacy deriving from the consent of
the governed rather than as a document providing an aspirational
point of departure in a judge's quest for new rules to better accommodate evolving notions of human dignity.

B. RAOUL BERGER*
Let me depart for a moment from my written remarks. My difference with Justice Brennan is that, under the cloud of rhetoric,
what he really is espousing is a right to revise the Constitution. I
have an article forthcoming discussing Brennan's out-of-court re1. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 15, 17 (Federalist Soc'y 1986).
2. Judge Robert H. Bork, speech to the University of San Diego Law School (Nov. 18,
1985), id. at 47, 49.
* Charles Warren Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard Law School,
Retired.
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marks explaining his positions, which seeks to demonstrate that.1
This is what the controversy is basically about: Can the Constitution be brought up to date by judges? Are they authorized to do
so? Or must it be done exclusively by the amendment process?
I have never taken a blanket position that intent is clear at all
points. At most points it is ambiguous and inconclusive; but I
have always fought for one proposition that where it is unmistakably clear and the Court has acted in the teeth of it, rewritten
it-that is abominable.
Let me give you an example from the history of the fourteenth
amendment that underlies the one-man, one-vote rule. Roscoe
Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
which drafted the amendment, stated it would be futile to ask
three-quarters of the states to do the very thing which most of
the Committee had refused to do. Another member of that committee, Senator Jacob Howard, said that three-fourths of the
states of this union could not be induced to vote to grant a right
of suffrage. The Chairman of the Committee, Senator William
Fessenden, said that there was not the slightest probability that it
would be adopted by the states. A unanimous report of the Committee expressed doubt that the states would consent to surrender a power they already exercised. The report thought it best to
leave the suffrage question with the people of each state.
It is mighty clear that the Framers intended to exclude suffrage
from the fourteenth amendment. That is why I have little sympathy and waste little time on the philosophical wanderings of most
of the academicians of today, whom judges do not understand
and will never read anyway.
Discussion of constitutional interpretation should start with the
question: What does "interpret" mean? In 1755, Dr. Johnson's famous Dictionary defined "interpret" as "[t]o explain; to translate;
to decipher . . . to expound." 2 So it remains today; the Oxford

Dictionary defines "interpret" as "[t]o expound
• . . to elucidate; to explain."' To explain is not
Invariably the Founders discussed the judicial
"expounding" the Constitution." Commenting on

the meaning of
to revise.
role in terms of
the exclusion of

1. Berger, Justice Brennan v. The Constitution, 29 B.C.L. REv. 787 (1988).

2. 1 S.

JOHNSON,

A

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

3. OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY 1031 (3d ed. 1964).
4. For citations of Expounding the Law, see R. BERGER,
COURT 409 (1969).

(2d ed. 1755).
CONGRESS V.
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the Supreme Court justices from a Council of Revision that would
share the President's veto, Edward Corwin correctly concluded
that the Framers acted on the principle that "the power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding the law." 5
That principle was rooted in the common law and the courts recognized it again and again. Francis Bacon cautioned judges "to
remember that their office is . . . to interpret law, and not to
make law."" James Wilson, a leading -architect of the Constitution, instructed 4 judge to "remember that his duty. . . is, not to
make the law, but to interpret and apply it."' 7 In Luther v. Borden Chief Justice Taney declared, "It is the province of a court to
expound law, not to make it."' This principle was at the heart of
the separation of powers, as Chief Justice Marshall perceived:
"The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that
the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary
construes the law." 9
Whatever may be one's definition of "interpretation," one thing
it plainly does not mean is-making law. The "nonoriginalist" interpreter, wrote Walter Benn Michaels, "isn't interpreting an old
text, but either writing a new one or imagining that someone else
has written it."' 10
"Interpretation" and "original intention" have long been
closely allied. In the seventeenth century John Selden reduced
the common law to an aphorism: "[A] Man's writing has but one
true Sense, which is that which the Author meant when he writ
it."" This did not envisage a psychological search of the author's
mind but rather contemporary proof of what he intended to accomplish. That is the counsel of common sense. The essence of
communication is that a writer should be permitted to explain
what his words mean; the reader may not insist that he knows
better than the writer what the writer means. To maintain the
contrary, as Judge Frank Easterbrook observed, is to assume
5. E. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 42 (1914) (quoting Strong
RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 75 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)).
6. F. BACON, SELECTED WRITINGS 138 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1955).
7. 2 J. WILSON, WORKS 502 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).

in 2

8. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41 (1849).
9. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) (emphasis added). In Minor v.

Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874), Chief Justice Waite reiterated that the
Court's "province is to decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be."

10. Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 673, 678 (1985).
11. J. SELDEN, TABLE TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 10 (1696).
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when determining meaning
that "it is the readers rather than the
12
writers that matter.
As long ago as the end of the thirteenth century, recounted
Chief Justice Frowycke, a fifteenth century sage, the judges asked
the "statute makers whether a warrantie with assettz shulde be a
barre [in the statute of Westminster] & they answered that it
shulde." "And so," Frowycke continued, "in our own dayes, have
those that were the penners & devisors of statutes bene the grettest lighte for exposicion of statutes. 1 3 Elsewhere I have shown
that such was the invariable practice across the centuries." Small
wonder that Chief Justice Marshall stated that he could cite from
the common law "the most complete evidence that the intention
is the most sacred rule of interpretation." 5 Writing in 1939, Jacobus tenBroek said that the Court "has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of constitutional
construction is the discovery of the intention of those persons
who formulated the instrument."' 6
Did the Framers intend us to be guided by their intent? They
did. First, they labored against the background of common law
practices. As the Court stated, they "were born and brought up in
the atmosphere of the common law and thought and spoke in its
vocabulary. ' 17 For instance, they consulted Blackstone as to the
scope of ex post facto. 8 It is the nonoriginalists who have the
burden of proving that the Founders gave them the privilege of
jettisoning "the most sacred rule of interpretation.' 9 As Justice
Story put it, "[Aire the rules of the common law to furnish the
proper guide, or is every court and department to give any interpretation according to its own arbitrary will?" 2 Justice Story em12. F.H. Easterbrook, The Influence of JudicialReview on Constitutional Theory, in A
170, 173 (1987).
13. A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 151-52 (S.
Thorne ed. 1942).
14. Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296
(1986); see also Berger, The Founders' Design-According to Jefferson Powell, to be published in 67 TEX. L. REV. (1989).
15. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 167 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
16. tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV.
399 (1939).
17. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 (1925).
18. 2 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 448 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
19. See supra text accompanying note 15.
20. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 166 n.2
WORKABLE GOVERNMENT?: THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS
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phasized that rules of construction provide a "fixed standard...
by which to measure [the Constitution's] powers."2 1 Second, the
Framers resorted to a written Constitution in order to limit the
power they delegated, and as Philip Kurland observed, "such a
Constitution could have only a fixed and unchanging meaning, if
it were to fulfill its function."2 2 So, given that suffrage plainly was
excluded from the fourteenth amendment, it does violence to the
presupposition of a "fixed" Constitution to assume that the
Framers did not intend us to be bound by their intention. Third,
James Wilson urged that the Journals of the Convention be preserved because "as false suggestions may be propagated it should
not be made impossible to contradict them. '2 3 In other words,
"false" interpretations could be rebutted by resort to the Founders' intention. Washington, President of the Convention, cited to
the Journals in 1796.24 So too, Abraham Baldwin, Caleb Strong,
Charles Pinckney and Pierce Butler, Framers all, referred to discussions in the Convention. 5 In the ratification conventions,
those who had been delegates to the Federal Convention were frequently called upon to explain provisions of the Constitution. All
of which indicates that the Founders themselves looked for guidance to the intentions of the Framers. How can we conclude that
they absolved us from respect for that intention?
In light of the foregoing, we should define "liberty" as it was
understood by the Founders. Blackstone, whom they regarded as
the oracle of the common law, stated that the "personal liberty
[of individuals] consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing
situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own
inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless
by due course of law."'26 Charles Warren's study led him to conclude that under the common law, liberty meant simply "the
right to have one's person free from physical restraint."27 During
(5th ed. 1905).
21. Id. at § 399, p.305.

22. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978). Justice William Paterson
declared, "The constitution is certain and fixed ... and can be revoked or altered only by
the authority that made it." Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 303, 308
(C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
23. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 18, at 648.
24. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 760-61 (1796).
25. Baldwin, 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 18, at 369-70; Strong, id. at 247; Pinckney, id. at
248-50; Butler, id. at 250.
26. 1 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.

27. Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV.
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the 1866 debates on the Civil Rights Act, James Wilson, chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, read the Blackstone excerpt
to the House.2" Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts urged the
House to ensure that the freedman "can go where he pleases." 9
This was a response to the Black Codes which sought to chain the
freedman to his hovel. In Dean James Bond's study of the campaign for ratification of the fourteenth amendment, he found that
stump speakers were apt to explain that "liberty" means "the
right to sue and be sued, to be protected in their person and
property, the right of locomotion-the right to go where they
please and live where they please and own property where they
please."3 0 This was part of the "limited category of rights," to
borrow from Georgia v. Rachel, that the Framers "intended to
protect."3 1 Modern notions of "liberty" cannot be rooted in constitutional history but are constructs fashioned by the modern
Court, a cornucopia overflowing with rights undreamed of either
by the Framers of 1787 or of 1866.
Finally, the Court itself has "abandoned" employment of the
due process clause "to nullify laws which a majority of the Court
believed to be economically unwise."3 2 Justice Black regarded resort to substantive due process as "no less dangerous when used
to enforce this Court's views about personal rights than those
about economic rights.""3 As Justice Frankfurter declared, the
"Constitution does not give us greater veto power when dealing
with one phase cf 'liberty' than with another."' The logic that
bars the one equally bars the other. Indeed, for the Founders,
property "was the basic liberty, because until a man was secure in
his property, until it was protected from arbitrary seizure, life
and liberty could mean little."3 " Let us not substitute glittering
431, 443-44 (1926).
28. A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES 164 (1967).
29. Id. at 98.
30. Bond, The Original Understandingof the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio
and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435, 448 (1985).
31. 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
32. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
34. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Holmes stated, "I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us
carte blanche to'embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions." Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35. 1 P. SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 272 (1962). "For most men, to be deprived of ... private
property would be a far greater and more deeply felt loss of liberty than to be deprived of
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generalities for the hard facts of history.

C.

ROBERT

W.

BENNETT*

I want to discuss problems in interpreting the Constitution,
particularly the open-ended provisions that give rise to so much
contemporary litigation, by drawing on two models or styles of
judging that have been discussed in the literature on the judicial
process. These are an individualistic model and an institutional
model. In the individualistic model, the judge searches for his or
her own best answer to the question of interpretation, quite apart
from the interpretations that present colleagues or past courts
may have provided on related matters-save as those other interpretations might prove persuasive to the judge as his individual
quest proceeds. The institutional judge, on the other hand, struggles with questions of interpretation on his own terms, to be sure,
but recognizes an additional obligation to accommodate his individual views to an institutional mission. In the individualistic
model, one would usually expect nine different opinions on a nine
person court and no particular respect for precedent; in the institutional model, a single opinion with no dissents and infrequent
overruling of prior opinions.
No judge pursues either style in the extreme, but by degrees all
judges display both an individualistic and an institutional approach. The contrast between the two gave rise to an interesting
clash between Judges Easterbrook and Posner. Before becoming a
judge, Frank Easterbrook insisted on an extreme individualistic
model. In his article on ways of criticizing the Supreme Court,
Easterbrook concluded that inconsistency on the Court was not a
justifiable basis for criticism, because no justice could be expected
to accommodate his own individual views to the different views of
others.1 Of precedent in particular, Easterbrook said, "The order
of decisions has nothing to do with the intent of the Framers or
any of the other things that might inform constitutional interprethe right to speak freely." M. OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 44 (1962).
* Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 805, 828 (1982).
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tation."2 In a rejoinder in his book on federal courts, Judge Posner urged that a more institutional conception of the judge's role
is essential in achieving coherence and consistency in the law.'
I want to use these two models to discuss some difficulties with
an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. Much of
what I have written on constitutional interpretation has been critical of what is called originalism, the attempt to refer constitutional questions to the intentions, not the language but the intentions-mental states-of those responsible for the provisions in
question. The thrust of my criticism has been to insist on the importance of the judge's institutional role, along with what might
be called its vertical dimension-respect for precedent.
Although originalists seem to me to be animated by a commendable desire to achieve a large degree of consistency and stability in constitutional law, I believe they are misguided in part
because they ignore the role that precedent would play in a coherent originalism. For if originalism strives for the answers to constitutional questions that the original intenders would have given
if they were present and had lived through everything that had
happened in the meantime-indeed if they had decided all the
intervening cases-then it would necessarily assign a large role to
precedent. That, I assert, is simply a fact of human psychology. If
the original intenders actually had to engage in this hypothetical
exercise, they would have put great stake in their prior decisions
as the process proceeded.
There is the rub. In a system with quite general governing language and reliance on precedent, a significant degree of malleability and hence uncertainty will prove inevitable. For a variety of
reasons the questions that arise will often and easily be distinguishable from prior decisions, so that the inevitable use of precedent is bound to make decision a matter of judgment and of
choice.
To take a prominent example, the fact that the fourteenth
amendment intenders thought that nothing they did would jeopardize the legitimacy of legally required racial segregation in public schools, does not tell us how they would deal with the contemporary problem of racially segregated public schools, were they
here now and charged with deciding. Just as our answer now is
2. Id. at 820.
3. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 223, 243 (1985).
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that racial segregation is abhorrent, so might theirs be if they
knew what we know. Whether we say this is so because they may
well have changed their minds, or because the problem is not the
same today, does not matter for present purposes, as long as we
can agree that it is so.
It can perhaps now be seen that I am actually something of an
originalist, if one loosens the notion from the unrealistic aspirations for it of its proponents. If one conceives of the judiciary as
the contemporary institutional embodiment of the constitutional
decision-making enterprise that the original intenders began,
then original intentions have an ongoing role to play, but it is just
not the dispositive one upon which originalists insist. Precedent
functions in the project as the vehicle by which institutional continuity is maintained. If, as I assert, the original intenders would
be influenced by what they themselves decided in earlier cases,
even where that might be at odds with some characterizations of
what they "originally intended," then the distinction between a
regime of original intention and a regime of reliance on precedent
begins to dissolve.
My own view of the proper determinants of judicial decisions is
highly pluralistic, with heavy emphasis on judicial deference to
original intentions, to precedent and to the judgments of the political branches. But I also do not think there is any escape from
judicial value judgments as one important determinant of constitutional decisions. This is especially so where the governing language is as open-ended as that in our most litigated constitutional
provisions. In this respect, I believe that the familiar dichotomy
recited anew in the brochure advertising this conference between
the judiciary saying what the law is and what it should be, is a
false one.
There is a second dimension-the horizontal dimension-to the
judge's institutional role. This dimension is the judge's relationship to his immediate colleagues. Not nearly as much has been
written about this subject as about precedent, but we certainly
observe very different styles of judging along this dimension as
well. The tone of Judge Easterbrook's article suggests that no accommodation is appropriate along this dimension either, and
some quite prominent justices have insisted on searching for their
own best answers without regard to the differing opinions of their
colleagues. In recent times Justices Black and Douglas come to
mind as individualistic judges along the horizontal as well as the
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vertical dimension.
The institutional style, however, has long roots in American
constitutional jurisprudence. In Chief Justice Marshall's day dissent was very unusual. Even in more recent times, when dissent
has become commonplace, Justices Harlan, Stewart and Powell
each adopted an institutional stance-albeit each in his individual way-along both the horizontal and vertical dimensions.
There has been a good deal of comment lately about the change
in Justice Rehnquist's style of judging since becoming Chief Justice. The change might well be described as movement from an
individualistic to an institutional style, particularly along the horizontal dimension. That should not be a surprising development
for one who has by dint of office taken on an even larger identification with the institution he serves.
The horizontal dimension of the judge's institutional role actually may hold more promise for bringing coherence and consistency to the law than the vertical dimension. Precisely because
the problems courts confront are always changing, precedent will
never constrain very rigidly. This will be particuarly so for a
judge trying to follow an earlier decision in which he did not join.
He will then not have had the earlier occasion to puzzle through
later implications. Accommodation with one's immediate colleagues, on the other hand, will mean more unanimous decisions,
and more opinions commanding at least a majority of the Court.
Even unanimous opinions are open to varying later interpretations, of course, but initial agreement on both language and result
could serve substantially to contain and channel later differences.
Institutional behavior along the horizontal dimension should thus
tend to reinforce institutional behavior along the vertical dimension, at least as long as the personnel on the Court do not change
too rapidly.
As I have explained, in elaborating open-ended constitutional
language, a genuine originalism that brings the certainty that
originalists crave is not available. Any originalism that will bring
a high degree of certainty to the interpretation of these provisions
must ignore something that would undoubtedly have animated
the original intenders, had they been charged with the burden of
decision over time. What determinants of decision in the mental
makeup of the Framers should be counted and what should be
ignored is a question that has provoked wide divergence of opinion among originalists. Self-styled originalists prefer not to dis-
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cuss the question in terms of what to ignore; but in attempting to
answer their critics they show that there is no obvious-no
originalist if you will-answer to this question.
Henry Monaghan, for instance, insists that "[tihe relevant inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the language
when the Constitution was developed"-4-an "objective" approach
to originalism, in contrast to the more subjective understanding
that the phrase "original intention" suggests. But even among
those who grope for a satisfactory subjective conception of original intention, there is no agreement about what originalism really
entails.
My colleague at Northwestern, Michael Perry, while trying to
resolve the problem, exposes some of its difficulties. Perry quotes
with approval Ronald Dworkin's statement of a familiar difficulty
in sorting out the relevant beliefs. Dworkin says:
[P]eople's convictions do not divide themselves neatly into general principles and concrete applications. Rather they take the
form of a more complex structure of layers of generality, so that
people regard most of their convictions as applications of further
principles or values more general still. That means that a judge
will have a choice among more or less abstract descriptions of
the principle that he regards the framers as having entrusted to
his safekeeping . . ..
This passage from Dworkin poses one problem in resolving the
question of which aspects to ignore. Perry offers the following solution to Dworkin's difficulty:
The originalist, on the basis of available historical materials,
must engage in a hypothetical conversation with . . . 'the group
...mainly responsible for' the relevant ... provision in an effort to discern which principle they ... would have chosen...
as being the one that best captured the purpose or ... meaning
of what they did.6
The obvious difficulty is that answers in this hypothetical conversation can, and in all likelihood will, vary from one originalist
judge to the next. Such a conversation would, for instance, leave
ample room for the possibilities that racially segregated public
4. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. R~v. 723,
725 (1988).
5. Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, N.Y. Rev., Aug. 13, 1987, at 6.
6. M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS & LAW 127 (1988).
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schools were permissible or were forbidden.
This brings me to an additional problem with the originalist
enterprise. The appeal of originalism is in the certainty that it
promises-but cannot deliver. The promise, however, encourages
originalists in their individualistic conceptions of the judicial role.
(Actually Henry Monaghan, in his embrace of stare decisis, is an
exception to the individualistic inclination that typifies most
originalists.) Because there are so many variants of originalism,
and room for maneuvering within variants, the need for institutionally minded judges would likely be as great on an originalist
court as on a more pluralistic one. Without institutional glue, the
law of an originalist court would fall victim to destructive
centrifugal forces-yielding precisely the opposite of the certainty
the originalist seeks. On an originalist court, in other words, the
institutional judge would be badly needed but hard to find.
The erosion of institutional behavior on the Supreme Court is
already alarming. It is most evident in the runaway inclination to
dissent, exemplified by the gyrations on the Usery-Garcia issue
that may not yet be spent. Dissents do serve important purposes.
They provide, in Charles Evans Hughes' phrase, "an appeal to the
intelligence of a future day."9 Dissents can also serve a more immediate institutional purpose by laying bare weaknesses in the
majority's reasoning, providing a prod to greater craftsmanship
and finer substance. To be sure, the same purpose could be
served by pre-publication give and take, but the fact that the
light of day will eventually shine on the exchange probably makes
the dialogue even more salutary. And dissent must always be
available to a judge who thinks that a decision is beyond the pale.
Neither singly nor in combination, however, do these purposes of
dissent justify the Usery-Garciaspectacle or the extent of dissent
on the Court today.
Accommodation with one's colleagues is becoming a lost art on
the Supreme Court, but if cultivated anew it could provide a powerful institutional constraint alongside those traditionally cited.
7. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by Garcia, infra
note 8, by a 5-4 decision).
8. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In one of three
dissenting opinions, Justice Rehnquist predicted that the Usery principle "will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this Court." Id. at 580.
9. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
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In this endeavor, however, I fear that clinging to the hope of an
inevitably elusive originalism serves only to postpone the time
when the real purposes animating the originalist enterprise can be
realized.

D.

JOHN HARRISON*

The problem I am going to talk about, and that Dean Bennett
was just talking about, is the problem of earlier decisions and
change over time.
Earlier today, Professor Miller said that, sometimes, the Supreme Court seems like a drunken sailor, reeling from one side of
the deck of the ship to the other. I think that, sometimes, the
Supreme Court is more like the man who got drunk and lost his
watch, and has to get drunk again to find it. The Court has to
consult its own precedents in order to discover where it put the
Constitution.
I put the point that dramatically because the courts' practices
of adhering to their precedents, whether or not they were correct,
means that before we consider the question of how to interpret
the Constitution, we must consider the logically prior question of
whether to interpret the Constitution-the Constitution, that is,
as opposed to the precedents.
This question is practically significant because the precedents
that we have include some made-up doctrines-rules that bear no
relation to the text of the Constitution and its amendments-either as that text was understood when adopted or as we
understand it today.
An example of this is the doctrine of fifth amendment substantive due process. You cannot come up with it just by interpreting
the Constitution. It is not in the language, and it is not in the
history. If we had written those words yesterday, no one, unless
he had been corrupted by the last 200 years of constitutional experience, would think that the Due Process Clause means that
Congress can pass only reasonable laws. Nevertheless, substantive
* Associate Deputy Attorney General, United States Department of Justice. The views
expressed are those of the author, not the Department of Justice or the executive branch.
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due process figures prominently in cases like Dred Scott,' Korematsu v. United States,2 and some other favorites. So, there are
made-up doctrines.
Given our standard justification for judicial review, however,
made-up doctrines are profoundly problematic. When the Supreme Court tells you that you have to follow the Supreme Court
instead of following what the act of Congress tells you to do, it is
implicitly relying on Marbury v. Madison.3 As Judge Frank Easterbrook has pointed out forcefully, Marbury v. Madison justifies
only interpretation.' Nowhere does it justify making things up,
and nowhere does it justify doing something that is made-up because you made it up five years ago.
Under the official theory of judicial review and judicial action,
there is no room in the Constitution for made-up doctrines-at
least no obvious room. There are two possible responses to this
challenge.
First, if you ask the Supreme Court, they will tell you, of
course, that we have the doctrine of stare decisis, which is an accepted part of legal method. But it is a funny part of legal
method because, unlike, for example, the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, the doctrine of stare decisis, which
means following what you did ten years ago or in 1854, is not a
means of interpretation at all. It may be an institutional constraint, as Dean Bennett described, but is not a means of figuring
out what a text says. Therefore you cannot use the Marbury v.
Madison justification for it in any obvious sense. You cannot determine what the Constitution means by looking at the precedents, unless the precedents are about the Constitution and not
about something made-up.
Perhaps there is a better theory about where we get stare decisis than the claim "that's just the way you read things." But here
I want you to join me in a moment of vertigo: nobody knows what
it is. The Supreme Court does not have, and the legal culture
does not have, an official explanation that gets you from the Constitution to the notion that you follow the precedents instead of
the Constitution. The Marbury for stare decisis-the case that
1.
2.
3.
4.
PUB.

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (Marshall, CA.).
Easterbrook, Legal Interpretationand the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. &
POL'Y 87, 95-96 (1984).
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deduces the rule of precedent from the written Constitution-is
not to be found in the United States Reports.
You can try to sketch a theory that precedent is implicit in the
concept of judicial power. Maybe stare decisis is the way courts
do things. But is the basis of stare decisis, as it came down to us
historically, to be found in the notion of judicial power or is it to
be found in the fact that most of the law at the time the Constitution was written was common law; that is, is stare decisis methodology or is it about the content of the law?
Another possible explanation, which is related to what Dean
Bennett was talking about, is that the rule of precedent is implicit, not in the idea of the judicial power, but in the idea of a
court. A court is an institution and a judge is just part of a court.
When the institution speaks, it is indeed the institution that
speaks. It is the court and not the judge.
Perhaps the judge has to keep in mind what the court has done
and think of himself as part of a super-person who is, in some
sense, continuous over time. Such a person might reason, "I did
this 150 years ago in Dred Scott; if I am going to be the same
person who decided Dred Scott, maybe in the case at bar I have
to act consistently even though if I were to step back from this
fictional super-person and just read the fifth amendment, I would
never imagine such a result."
That is a candidate theory of stare decisis, but, as you can see,
it is filled with all sorts of difficulties, and it is certainly not a
generally accepted part of our legal culture. If you look down
from the tower of stare decisis that we are standing on, you will
find that there is nothing holding us up. Like me, you may then
get a little dizzy and have that moment of vertigo.
It is a strange experience to realize that there is something
deeply wrong with the legal culture. I do not want to suggest that
the whole problem of stare decisis is some evil plot by the courts.
It is not just the courts saying, "shut up, he explained," like Ring
Lardner's immortal response to a difficult question. This is a
scandal for the whole legal culture. Robert Bork, for example,
thinks there has to be a doctrine of stare decisis but he does not
know exactly what it is or where it comes from.
There is another possible response to the claim that made-up
doctrines are inconsistent with the theory on which the Court's
power claims to rest, the theory of Marbury. We might call this
meta-stare decisis, because it operates at a higher level than an
HeinOnline -- 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 850 1988-1989
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ordinary rule of law: meta-stare decisis is a way of telling which
rules to follow, not how to interpret them. This meta-principle
boldly asserts that when the written Constitution conflicts with
the precedents, the precedents win-that the precedents, not the
text, are in fact the law.
Paul Brest has written about this in his well-known article, The
5 and I think
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
his is the most powerful and clearest discussion of the problem
not only of stare decisis but of all sorts of extra-textual additions
to the Constitution. What Brest says, essentially, is that the authority of the written Constitution is not absolute in our legal culture, and that, as a matter of fact, courts do not derive their authority from a Marbury v. Madison rationale, which looks to the
Constitution as the source of the judiciary's authority. Brest asks:
What authority does the written Constitution have in our system of constitutional government? This is not an empty question. The English experience demonstrates that a constitutional
democracy-a government of limited powers ultimately responsible to its citizens-need not be premised on a written document. And although Article VI declares that the Constitution is
the "supreme Law of the Land," a document cannot achieve the
status of law, let alone supreme law, merely by its own
assertion.'
Brest says there has to be a social practice to make a rule the law.
To that extent there is what you might call an unwritten constitution-a warrant for doing whatever it is we do that is supposed
to give the right answer.
Brest then argues that the unwritten constitution that we actually accept validates the practice of judicial review and the doctrines that the Supreme Court has developed, including the doctrines that do not come from the written constitution. Brest says,
"[T]he practice of supplementing and derogating from the text
and original understanding is itself part of our constitutional tradition."'7 That is, it is simply accepted that the Supreme Court
sometimes invalidates laws on the basis of made-up theories, as it
did in Dred Scott, and that it sometimes upholds laws in the face
of constitutional provisions that clearly forbid them, as it did in
5. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204
(1980) (criticizing originalist modes of interpretation).
6. Id. at 225.

7. Id.
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Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell.'
So, Dean Brest and today Dean Bennett have posed the ultimate question: should we look for guidance to considerations of
stability and continuity, and should we perhaps consult some
thick moral principles as well, like the ones that give substantive
due process? Are those considerations part of the unwritten constitution? Or, instead, do we have a very thin unwritten constitution, a very thin justification for the way we do things-maybe
the thinnest one possible?
As you might guess, I do not agree with Dean Brest. I think
that the notion of a "thick" unwritten constitution is inconsistent
with our actual practices and with our fundamental principles. As
to practice, all officers of government take an oath to the Constitution, and they do not put quotation marks around the word.
Partly for that reason, the claim that courts do not appeal for
their authority to Marbury-and thus to the written Constitution-is empirically false. What do you suppose would happen if
the judges one day announced that this Marbury stuff was just
eyewash, and they were going to decide cases the way they liked;
would that produce any public outrage? If so, then perhaps the
unwritten constitution consists solely of the command, "Follow
the written Constitution."
The argument from fundamental principles is harder to make,
of course, so I will conclude by using a slogan instead of an argument. Professor Aman said this morning that every age seeks a
new order for a new world. I do not know whether it was accidental, but he was paraphrasing one of the phrases located on the
back of a dollar bill, on the obverse of the Great Seal of the
United States: Novus Ordo Seclorum. That means "a new order
for the ages." I want to conclude by suggesting that one of the
things that makes the American nation the new order for the ages
is precisely the idea of a written Constitution, written down so
that it does not have to be approached through the methods of
the common law and by the priests of the common law, but written down in black and white so that any fool can read it.

8. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). If you wonder whether that is what the Court did in Blaisdell,
read the case.
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E.

DAVID FRIEDMAN*

I should start by saying that I know less about constitutional
interpretation than many people in this room and, therefore, will
not talk about it. What I will be talking about is not what the
Constitution means but rather why one has constitutions and
what they ought to be like. I will approach that as an economist,
an economist interested in trying to use economics to understand
political institutions. I hope, given limits of time, to get back to
original intent, rigid constitutions and a case both for and against
Lochner v. New York.'
I want to start with an economic idea, a very simple and interesting economic idea originated, as far as I know, by Gordon Tullock and popularized in an article by Ann Krueger on the subject
of "rent-seeking." 2 We begin with the following story.
The government of India is giving away $10 million worth of
valuable import permits. That government chooses to set an official exchange rate for its currency very much more favorable than
the market exchange rate. If you are an Indian you will try to
persuade the government of India that you are a good guy and
should be given a piece of paper saying that this person can trade
rupees for dollars at the favorable official rate and import goods.
These pieces of paper are very valuable.
The point that Ann Krueger made was, if you are giving away
valuable things, people will spend resources making sure that
they, rather than others, get them. So that if the government of
India is giving away $10 million worth of import permits, there
will be a surplus of people who want them, and it will occur to
someone that by running ads about what a public-spirited firm he
has and how important it is for the welfare of India that his firm
be able to import medical equipment, he will increase the chance
that he will get a permit.
If the permits are worth $100,000 each, the applicant starts out
with a modest $5,000 ad campaign. But other firms also want the
permits and so they run $10,000 ad campaigns. He responds with
a $15,000 ad campaign, and if you think through the logic of the
* John M. Olin, Faculty Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School.
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2. Krueger, The PoliticalEconomy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 291
(1974).
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situation, you see that one will spend on the average $100,000 trying to influence whoever gives out the permits, with the result
that the people of India are $10 million worse off and the people
who get the permits are zero better off. That is to say, the full
value of what the government is giving out is dissipated in the
competition to obtain it.
I am rather fond of this idea because I invented it. I invented it
after Gordon Tullock, alas, but before Ann Krueger, as it happens, in The Machinery of Freedom.' In the chapter entitled,
"Thieves Market, or The Nonexistence of the Ruling Class," I
pointed out that even if the government makes many of us worse
off, it does not follow that there is someone else receiving the
benefit. Much of the benefit may, in fact, be competed away in
the political contest to acquire it.
In this example, it looks as though the full benefit will, through
competition, be dissipated. I would now like to give an example
that seems very different, in which the economics is exactly the
same and yet the result quite different.
The United States government decides to grant $10,000 a year
to everyone in the United States who is totally blind. On the margin, you still have rent-seeking. Somewhere in the United States
there is someone with very bad eyesight who is rather lazy and
decides to pretend that he is totally blind, and to give up a
$10,000 job in order to get a $10,000 subsidy. Just as for all those
Indian firms, he has spent the full value of the subsidy on acquiring it.
But in this case, he is not the average. Almost all the people
who receive the benefit can get it at no cost at all, because they
are already totally blind. So, at one extreme, a government program to give something away wipes out the full value of what is
being given away. At the other extreme, you have a program in
which a tiny bit of the benefit is wiped out, but almost all of it is
transferred. Speaking as an economist, the fundamental difference between the two situations is the elasticity of supply. In the
blindness case, you have a supply curve representing lots of people who can supply being blind at no cost at all because they are
blind, and a few people on the edge who can supply a little more
being blind if you pay them enough. In the case of the import
permits, on the other hand, the supply curve is more or less a
3. D.

FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL CAPITALISM
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straight horizontal line, and anybody can spend another $1,000 on
advertising. It is an interesting distinction between the two cases.
Let me now give you a third case and one that has been argued
to be possibly the most stupid thing the United States government has ever done. That is quite a distinction, and it is also one
of the most popular things the government has ever done. I am
referring to the homesteading program, the arrangement under
which a large part of the property of the United States became
private property. This argument was first made by Terry Anderson and is roughly as follows: Under homesteading, you get possession of land by farming it for a certain number of years. In
1840, if you farm a parcel of land beyond the frontier, you will
earn a large negative income because it is too far away to farm at
a profit. As time passes and the frontier moves west, around 1880,
it just barely becomes worth farming. But from then on the income goes steadily up, so that by 1950, this land is worth $1
million.
Under homesteading, when is the land settled? Well, obviously
the time to arrive is when it just becomes worth settling. But
there are lots of people who would like things for free. If you arrive at the land when it is just worth settling, you are getting that
whole future stream of income, the ownership of the land, at no
cost because you are breaking even on your farming. So you arrive
and discover someone is already there. It is just like the advertising case. Push it back and back and back. As a result the land is
settled too early and, in fact, it is settled so prematurely that the
settlers dissipate the entire value of the land. We are talking
about three-quarters of the area of the United States. The entire
value of the land is dissipated in the cost of people coming too
early, starving or nearly starving, and burning up the returns in
homesteading.
But the relevant question is the elasticity of supply of homesteaders. If, in a world with 10,000 people who are very good at
homesteading, and who do not mind being far away from neighbors, and another 10,000 who are pretty bad at it, you give out
15,000 homesteads, then the first 10,000 can settle just before the
second 10,000 arrive and there is still a large benefit. In this
model it is only the marginal person who dissipates the rent, not
the average person. Therefore, just how bad homesteading was
depends on what you believe were the attributes of the supply
group of homesteaders.
HeinOnline -- 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 855 1988-1989
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It has been suggested, most recently, in an article in Public
Choice by Stroup,4 that the solution is to auction off the land
instead of homesteading it. This raises a little bit of a problem. I
am working on an essay entitled Homesteading the Treasury,
premised on the idea of an auction of $100 million worth of land.
That money is now in the treasury and we, as individual members
of the political organism, start engaging in rent-seeking activities
to procure these funds for ourselves. It is not immediately obvious that we solve the problem by auctioning off the land. We
must analyze the rent-seeking behavior of the general political
system of interest groups trying to get special favors. Maybe the
equilibrium is that taxes drop by $100 million, or maybe we compete the $100 million away trying to get it.
Another suggestion that Stroup makes is that we should have
simply held a lottery in 1860. With a million parcels of land and
three million people, everyone has one chance in three of getting
a parcel, and they can then resell it. But you still get rent-seeking. The rent-seeking now is inefficient migration. People who
otherwise would have come to the United States in 1870 now
want to come in 1860 so as to participate in the land lottery. It is
like the blindness case. There are lots of people to whom it costs
nothing to be in America by 1860, namely, the ones who already
are here. Thus, most of the value is transferred, but still some of
it is dissipated.
Let me talk about what this line of arguments suggests about
constitutions and what constitutions ought to be like. First, you
would like constitutions to establish inflexible property rights;
that is, you want a system where it is difficult to acquire things
by spending resources trying to change the rules. Imagine a world
where, by spending $1,000 on a lawyer, I have a ten-percent
chance of persuading someone that your house is mine. By spending $2,000, I have a twenty-percent chance, and with $3,000, a
thirty-percent chance. In such a world the resources of the society
will be eaten up in the fight over claims to property.
Alternatively, imagine a world where only infrequently will
spending money on lawyers help persuade a court that the house
is mine instead of yours. That infrequent case corresponds to the
guy who decides to pretend he is blind. But where ninety-nine
4. Stroup, Buying Misery with Federal Land, 57 PUB. CHOICE 69 (1988).
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point nine percent of the time, no matter how much I spend, up
to the value of the house, I cannot get your property transferred
to me, then we have a world where not very many resources are
dissipated by rent-seeking.
When somebody tells me, as Mr. Baker did, that there are eight
different criteria for deciding on property and we must properly
balance them, or when someone tells me, as I gather the City of
San Jose told people, that there are seven different criteria for
deciding how much of your apartment you really own, which is
ultimately what rent price-fixing is about, my response is that I
better keep one hand on my wallet and use the other to dial my
lawyer. But it is hard to produce much while keeping one hand on
your wallet and using the other to dial your lawyer.
The bottom line is that in a world where deciding ownership is
difficult, ambiguous and expensive, people will all be poor. While
it is true that some differences in definitions of property rights
merely mean efficient ways of reaching different societies, there
are many definitions of property rights which entail very inefficient ways of achieving any society worth having; namely, those
definitions that result in extensive resources being spent on the
enterprise of transferring, retransferring, and defending against
the transferring of property.
Similarly, an almost unlimited amount of money could be spent
on trying to prove what men who died 180 years ago would have
believed had they lived for another 180 years. It is a rather unattractive basis for constitutional interpretation to say that if I can
do a more plausible job than you of constructing a fantasy about
which no proof really exists, then I win. The outcome of such a
system is large amounts of rent-seeking in the form of efforts to
get the right people onto the Supreme Court, which is done by
getting the right people into the White House and the right people into the Senate.
Again, it seems that does not tell us what the right rule is, but
it does suggest that you want some rule which is rigid. So, I am
now responding to my first point, which pertains to what the
Constitution should be like, and my answer is it should set very
rigid, easily interpreted definitions of property rights in the broad
sense in which economists understand property rights. The second point is that the Constitution itself should be clear, dogmatic
and inflexible, because if the Constitution itself can be readily
bent, resources will be spent on bending it.

HeinOnline -- 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 857 1988-1989

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:853

No doubt flexibility commonly sounds like a wonderful thing
and, with the additional information of 200 years, there are probably some ways in which one could better adapt the rules to present society. But you must balance against that advantage the
fact that if rules can be changed, people will spend resources
changing them.
This is an argument also for stare decisis; that is, once the
thing is settled, people should not be able to change it. That is
one way of gaining inflexibility. It is also an argument for literal
interpretation, if you believe that it is more practical to find out
what the writers actually meant than it is to find out what they
ought to have meant, and that is essentially some version of the
alternative. In one sense, I am agreeing with Raoul Berger. I am
arguing for a system where you find something out rather than
choose something. At the same time, I am an economist. Economists are experts on the logic of choice but not on technology.
What we are talking about is the technology of adjudicating disputes and producing decisions. The question of whether it is possible to get unambiguous answers to most disputes by asking
what the Founders would have said back then if we gave them the
dispute, is extremely problematic. Asking how the Founders
would have changed their minds in 180 years is going to be even
worse.
The general point really is not a conclusion about whether you
should or should not seek original intent. I do not know enough.
The point is to introduce a set of arguments which address a fundamental reason why we have constitutions, written or unwritten,
namely, the attempt to set up a construct of rules in which as
little as possible is dissipated on trying at the lower level to transfer property back and forth or at the higher level to change the
rules that define who owns what.

F. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SPEAKER: Professor Berger, whenever you allow a court to
look at the legislative history, are you not, in fact, inviting abuse
in that it can deliberately, no matter how plain the statute is, just
misread the legislative history to arrive at whatever social conclu-
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sion? And when a statute is plainly clear, as in the Bakke' case,
or perhaps capital punishment where the fifth amendment expressly allows it, should the court be allowed to look behind the
plain meaning of the language and look at legislative intent?
PROFESSOR BERGER: Instead of looking at desegregation,
let's talk about suffrage which poses the same problem. I read
some extracts that showed unmistakably that the Framers intended to exclude suffrage from the fourteenth amendment. In
the teeth of that exclusion, the Court said that human dignity
requires that one man should have one vote. That was just a judicial construct, a rewriting of the Constitution, which can only be
changed by amendment, according to Article Five. That is a flagrant abuse of power.
I would always look for the explanation of the Framers, what
did they mean. Let me give you an example. Take what Dean
Bennett calls the grand open-ended clauses like equal protection.
Wallace Mendleson says that equal protection is so broad as to be
almost meaningless; John Ely regards the words as inscrutable;
J.R. Pole wrote that the pursuit of equality was the pursuit of an
illusion. And another activist said that different justices have
very different beliefs and are likely to have very different opinions as to what is allowed under equal protection. So here are
these grand open-ended words.
It is plain that at the ratification stage equal protection did not
contemplate that every man would have the vote. Because
whatever else equal protection meant, it did not mean suffrage
for blacks. That, Justice Harlan said, is irrefutable and unanswerable and he was right.
Bear in mind that I have not spun broad theories, but I said
there are six or seven flagrant cases. Segregation was one of them
and I could make the same proof about segregation that I made
about suffrage, maybe not quite as airtight but still very powerful.
I would invite Dean Bennett to deal with that. Let's not deal with
hypothetical cases. Let's not have table tapping to bring the ghost
of a Framer here, and, by the way, let me give you an example of
some results of that kind of table tapping.
Dworkin, who is one of the gurus of the activist movement, had
an imaginary dialogue with a fourteenth amendment Framer, just
1. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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like Dean Bennett described. He brought him here and asked
him, "What would you do about segregation?" The Framer replied, "Well, as it happens, I have no particular preferences myself, either way, about segregated schools. I haven't thought much
about it." If he had not, it was because desegregation was unthinkable in an atmosphere rampant with racism. Here is the
clincher: James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, was constrained to assure the Framers that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 did not mean that children should attend the
same schools. Nevertheless, we have this reverie by Dworkin
where our Framer tells him he did not even think about it. Well,
if he did not think about it, he was asleep at the switch.
I want to hammer home a couple of propositions. I am not interested in states of mind; instead we ought to be governed by
what a man utters. If he says "I mean the moon that is made of
green cheese," we may think he is crazy, but he is entitled to tell
us that, and you have got to start from there.
MR. CRIBB: Professor Berger invited Dean Bennett to comment on suffrage so let's afford him that opportunity.
DEAN BENNETT: Well, that topic is your choice, not mine. I
think the suffrage decisions are questionable but I would reach
that conclusion for different reasons than you do.
Two people have suggested that I was advocating that a justice,
that the Supreme Court today, should try to figure out what the
Framers' or intenders' answers to contemporary questions would
be had they lived through everything that had happened in the
meantime. That is not what I was suggesting. What I was suggesting was that if the Framers had decided all cases up until
today and were charged with the task of deciding today, precedent would play a substantial role in the answers they would give.
That observation is based on my reading of ordinary human
psychology.
So that given that fact of human psychology, one cannot simply
say, "I know the answer that they would have given to the question that is now posed because I read the history." You have to
take, they would have to take, anyone trying to answer that question would have to take a lot of other things into account-very
much including precedent.
Reliance on precedent is thus part of any coherent and meanHeinOnline -- 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 860 1988-1989
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ingful originalist approach. There is no "table tapping" called for.
SPEAKER: In Mr. Harrison's talk, he focused on the question
of how precedent and the original text work together or, in fact,
do not work together, and how we have not even the beginnings
of a theory to account for this. What he seemed to be implying is
that from a strict formalist rule of law perspective the rot or the
shakiness in constitutional adjudication goes back a lot further
.than the Warren Court or the Lochner Court. It was there in the
beginning of the Taney Court when the commerce clause started
to get really funny looking. What I would like to ask is if the rot
goes back that far, if the system has been essentially illegitimate
for three-fourths of its existence, at which point does a formalist
insistence on that sort of legitimacy become vain and anti-Burkian from a conservative point of view? For example, there is this
George III guy but I am very sure there is a steward in Italy who
is really the king. It seems to me that if a wrong turn in constitutional jurisprudence was taken that far back, that after a certain
point one who is excessively legitimate and excessively formalist
becomes like a Jacobite and becomes caught in his own
abstractions.
MR. HARRISON: This is a very good question. Before I answer
it, let me say that as to what Dean Bennett said a moment ago,
the process that he described but did not claim as his own is a
species of originalism. It is not the only species of originalism and
it is a fairly nonformalistic type, but it is originalism.
Let me turn now to the question: how can legitimation be tied
strictly to the written text when we have had substantive departures for such a long time and when we have had the proclaimed
doctrine of stare decisis, a methodological departure, for even
longer? The first references to stare decisis started coming up, I
think, in the 1820's. They are very old.
One response to the question is to say that the generally accepted system is not in what Rawls would call "reflective equilibrium." That is, it still has some inconsistencies. If you ask on
Tuesday, "Do you believe in the written text?" everybody will say
"yes." If you ask on Thursday, "Do you believe in doing things
every day the way we do them today?" everyone will say "yes."
But those answers are not consistent.
What we may have to do, either practically, if the debate actu-
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ally begins to call into question the content of the consensus, or
theoretically, if we want to work out what the consensus should
be since the one that is there is very hard to follow, is ask, which
would we jettison? If we decided to jettison the attachment to
text, where would we be, and is that a position that people would
accept if it were put to them?
These are not questions as to the content of the legal system so
much as they are questions of what legal system are you going to
choose to be under.
PROFESSOR BERGER: I would like to make a comment on
the gentleman's remark.
I take it that you say if practices have endured for 100 or 150
years, that they have become a tradition. I cannot buy that. The
fact that larceny was repeated 100 times does not make it less
larcenous; nor can you change the Constitution by lethargy, particularly in view of the fact that the Court has never told the people that it is changing the Constitution. The Court always professes to speak in terms of the articles of the Constitution.
MR. HARRISON: I agree with Professor Berger. And I think
that what is really bedrock on this issue are two powerful considerations. First is the fact that except on rare occasions, like Home
Building & Loan v. Blaisdell, the Court will never say they are
just making it up; and second, the judges, the President, all the
officers of the executive branch, all of Congress, and all the officers of the state governments take an oath to the Constitution,
and there are no quotes around the word Constitution When they
take the oath.
SPEAKER: Professor Friedman, one might expect that certain
types of economic regulation ought to be drafted and interpreted
and valued based on their economic efficacy, but I wonder what is
the basis for a presumption that the Constitution ought to be economically effective. After all, if you steal five dollars from me, it
would be economically inefficient to prosecute both criminally
and civilly but it is something that the Constitution goes out of
its way to protect nonetheless.
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: There are really two different
2. Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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questions there. The second has to do with the economics of
crime and my answer would be that a policy of prosecuting people
for stealing is an economically efficient rule; it is a mistake to
think of stealing as a transfer with zero cost. On the contrary, if
you run through the argument that I was making in my talk, the
existence of opportunities to steal diverts resources into theft until, on the margin, the thief is giving up a $10,000 job in order to
steal $10,000 and one cent. So it is economically efficient to prevent theft.
The other question is: Is that the only thing in the world? And
I guess my answer is no, economic efficiency is not the only thing
in the world, although it is a much broader thing than most noneconomists realize. Economic efficiency in a very rough sense is
the equivalent of maximized total human happiness. I could qualify it a lot, but I am not going to now. But even if it were the
exact equivalent, I do not believe that total human happiness is
the only thing in the world that matters. I could imagine cases
where the utilitarian answer was A and my answer would be B.
So, Lam really not saying I can rigorously prove what the Constitution should be. What I am saying is that economic efficiency or
human happiness are very widely shared and very important values. Therefore, they ought to have very great weight in what kind
of constitution you design.
PROFESSOR BERGER: I will take the privilege of making a
kind of a circuitous response that Dean Bennett made to me.
DEAN BENNETT: Citing precedent, of course.
PROFESSOR BERGER: A distinguished French publicist,
Raymond Aron, said that it is proof of a proposition that opposing proofs are so false.
In a 705-page symposium with maybe fifty theories of interpretation, all written by those who want to see the Court have the
power to revise the Constitution, a Canadian law professor wrote
that American scholars struggle to offer some theoretically valid
account of the jurisprudential enterprise.' That they are energized by a growing sense of desperation. I could quote you a half
dozen others, including Brest and Perry, and other activists, try3. Hutchinson, Alien Thoughts: A Comment on ConstitutionalScholarship, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 701 (1985).
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ing to come up with a valid theory that justifies what you claim
judges can do. They have not been able to do it.
The theory I am talking about did not spring full-grown from
my brow, not at all. Thomas Grey of Stanford said it is deeply
rooted in constitutional history, in the Constitution and in decisions of the Supreme Court. It is only really in the last forty or
fifty years that the do-gooders, as Holmes called them, have fashioned what they call a new mainstream. And it was this new
mainstream that they were trying to douse Bork in.
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